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Why we should use animals to study economic decision 
making – a perspective
Tobias Kalenscher* and Marijn van Wingerden
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Despite the rich tradition in psychology and biology, animals as research subjects have never 
gained a similar acceptance in microeconomics research. With this article, we counter this 
trend of negligence and try to convey the message that animal models are an indispensible 
complement to the literature on human economic decision making. This perspective review 
departs from a description of the similarities in economic and evolutionary theories of human 
and animal decision making, with particular emphasis on the optimality aspect that both classes 
of theories have in common. In a second part, we outline that actual, empirically observed 
decisions often do not conform to the normative ideals of economic and ecological models, 
and that many of the behavioral violations found in humans can also be found in animals. In a 
third part, we make a case that the sense or nonsense of the behavioral violations of optimality 
principles in humans can best be understood from an evolutionary perspective, thus requiring 
animal research. Finally, we conclude with a critical discussion of the parallels and inherent 
differences in human and animal research.
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at choice mechanisms and their neural substrates in animals. We 
maintain that, even though there might exist a many-to-one map-
ping of neural implementations to choice processes, careful com-
parisons across species can complement human microeconomics 
research by supplying possible answers to the question why we 
make decisions as we do.
Assumptions in biologicAl And economic Accounts of choice 
behAvior
Animal decision making has traditionally been studied assum-
ing that animals optimize their energy intake and reproductive 
opportunities under evolutionary pressure, and have adapted their 
choice behavior accordingly. Hence, many ecological theories of 
decision making have in common with economic models that 
they focus on optimality of choice behavior, which gives both 
schools of thinking a normative flavor. Moreover, both schools 
share crucial concepts, such as equilibrium states in social exchange 
(Nash, 1950) or evolutionary strategies (Dawkins, 2006). In that 
normative tradition, until recently, economic theories departed 
from the assumption that decision makers have (i) stable prefer-
ences over time and context, (ii) are motivated by their material 
self-interest (iii) are rational (in the sense that they make internally 
and intertemporally consistent decisions that are in accordance 
with their own stable preferences), and (iv) that decision makers’ 
choices are made with respect to final states and not with respect 
to changes of states (in the sense that decisions should not be 
made with respect to gains or losses, but with respect to the final 
monetary levels1; Friedman and Savage, 1948, 1952; Varian, 2006). 
“The difference in mind between man and the higher animals, great 
as it is, certainly is one of degree and not of kind.”
The Descent of Man (Charles Darwin, 1871)
similArities between normAtive theories of decision 
mAking in economics And biology
why study AnimAl decision mAking?
Do animals make economic decisions? Even though the answer is 
trivial for students of the cognitive sciences, surprise and skepti-
cism is a common response, not only among lay people, when we 
answer this question with “yes.” Animals don’t think, so how can 
they make economic decisions, and why would it be interesting to 
study them? In very general terms, economics is a discipline that 
aims to predict how human individual decisions affect the supply 
and demand of (usually limited) resources. So, what are the reasons 
for studying animal behavior when one is ultimately interested in 
theories of human economic decision making?
Of course, monkeys and other animals are widely used in neuro-
economics and economically flavored neuroscience research, often 
for methodological reasons (see for instance Floresco et al., 1997, 
2008; Shizgal, 1997; Leon and Shadlen, 1998; Platt and Glimcher, 
1999; Cardinal et al., 2001; Yanagihara et al., 2001; Izawa et al., 
2003, 2005; Phillips et al., 2003; Barraclough et al., 2004; Dorris 
and Glimcher, 2004; Sugrue et al., 2004; Kalenscher et al., 2005, 
2006a; McCoy and Platt, 2005; Tobler et al., 2005; Padoa-Schioppa 
and Assad, 2006; Roesch et al., 2006; van den Bos et al., 2006a, b; 
Yang and Shadlen, 2007; Kalenscher and Pennartz, 2008; Kim et al., 
2008; Gan et al., 2009; Louie and Glimcher, 2010). However, as we 
will argue in this article, technical reasons are not the only grounds 
for studying animal choice behavior. In order to fully comprehend 
the origins of human choice behavior, we should investigate the 
evolutionary roots of our   decision making processes by looking 
1For example, a decision maker should be indifferent between these two cases: (a) 
an individual has $0 and wins $100 (final state $100), or, (b) an individual is first 
endowed with $200 but then loses $100 of this endowment (final state $100).Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience    June 2011  | Volume 5  |  Article 82  |  2
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fitness and energy gain to time- and outcome-variable, risky 
environments (Stephens, 1981, 2008; Stephens and Krebs, 1986; 
Kacelnik and Bateson, 1996). According to risk-sensitive foraging 
theory, if an animal chooses between two food patches offering 
equal average gains, but differing in outcome variance (risk), then 
a concave, monotonically increasing and decelerating function 
linking Darwinian fitness to energy gain would predict risk aver-
sion (Figure 1A). Note that accounts referring to skewed memory 
representations of the risky outcomes can equally well account 
for risk aversion, but to a lesser extent for risk seeking (Reboreda 
and Kacelnik, 1991; Bateson and Kacelnik, 1996; Kacelnik and 
Bateson, 1997).
decision mAking over time: discounted utility theory, rAte 
mAximizAtion, And the mAtching lAw
Most of our decisions do not yield immediate outcomes, but out-
comes that can only be realized at some point in the future. Literally 
all human and non-human animals tested devalue (discount) 
future relative to immediate outcomes (Samuelson, 1937; Knapp 
et al., 1959; McDiarmid and Rilling, 1965; Chung and Herrnstein, 
1967; Rachlin and Green, 1972; Ainslie, 1974, 1975; Benzion et al., 
1989; Green et al., 1994; Kalenscher et al., 2005, 2006a, b; Kalenscher 
and Pennartz, 2008). In economics, the dominant framework 
for decision making over time is discounted utility theory (DU; 
Samuelson, 1937; Koopmans, 1960; Lancaster, 1963; Fishburn and 
Rubinstein, 1982; Prelec and Loewenstein, 1991; Frederick et al., 
2002; Kalenscher and Pennartz, 2008). In brief, DU posits that a 
decision maker behaves as if she maximized discounted utility, with 
discounted utility being the sum of the discount-factor-weighted 
utilities of all possible final states. Classically, DU assumed an 
exponentially decreasing discount function with a constant dis-
count rate (Figure 2A; Samuelson, 1937). Constant discounting 
has important implications for rationality and time-consistency 
of preference. According to DU, it is not irrational or non-optimal 
per se to prefer small, short-term over large, long-term rewards, 
even if the preference for immediacy results in an overall reduced 
net gain over time. However, DU requires consistency over time. 
That is, if an individual prefers a small, short-term reward over a 
large, long-term reward, and both rewards are shifted in time by 
Despite crucial differences, there are remarkable similarities in the 
assumptions and implications made in economic theories and 
ecological models of animal foraging in the biological literature 
(cf. Caraco, 1983; Stephens and Krebs, 1986; Kacelnik, 2006) and, 
to a somewhat lesser extent, in reinforcement learning models in 
psychology (Thorndike, 1911; Herrnstein, 1961, 1970; Navarick 
and Fantino, 1974). We like to illustrate the similarities between 
the disciplines with two examples: decision making under risk 
and over time.
decision mAking under risk: expected utility theory And risk 
sensitivity theory
One of the dominant theories in economics for decision making 
under risk, expected utility theory (EU), formally prescribes choice 
behavior of decision makers that are assumed to behave as if they 
maximized expected utility. Expected utility is the sum of the prob-
ability-weighted utilities of all possible final states of an option, i.e., 
after the options’ prospects are integrated with the current asset 
level (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). Assuming concave 
utility functions (Bernoulli, 1954), EU predicts risk aversion, as 
illustrated in Figure 1.
In biology, classic optimal foraging theory assumes that evo-
lution has favored foraging strategies that maximize the rate of 
energy intake as a proxy of Darwinian fitness (Charnov, 1976; 
Cowie, 1977). Since a given food source is progressively depleted 
with the time spent foraging, the marginal energy gain obtained 
from a given source is decreasing as a function of foraging time. 
Hence, the rate of gain, and thus ultimately Darwinian fitness 
associated with a food source is monotonically rising, but, due to 
its decreasing marginal gain, decelerating over time spent forag-
ing. However, this alone is not yet sufficient to draw a parallel 
between optimal foraging and EU. In fact, classic optimal foraging 
theory posited that animals behaved as if they considered only 
average outcomes in the environment, and hence ignored outcome 
variability and risk. Consequently, inconsistent with the empirical 
reality (Kacelnik and Bateson, 1996; Kacelnik, 1997; Bateson and 
Kacelnik, 1998), classic optimal foraging models predicted risk-
neutral attitudes. Risk-sensitive foraging theory has extended the 
classic framework of non-linear relationships between Darwinian 
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Figure 1 | utility functions can explain risk attitude according to expected 
utility theory and risk sensitivity theory. (A) Utility (for humans) or Darwinian 
fitness (for animals) as a function of the magnitude of a commodity. The utility/
fitness curve is concave and is a decelerating function of the current level of 
stimulus magnitude (wealth/amount) because the marginal utility/fitness 
increment decreases with increasing level of stimulus magnitude. A concave 
utility/fitness function predicts risk aversion when choosing between a 
medium-sized, certain reward (RM) and a risky option offering large or small 
rewards (RS and RL) with equal probabilities. (B) A convex function predicts 
risk proneness.www.frontiersin.org  June 2011  | Volume 5  |  Article 82  |  3
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would maximize energy gain rate in choice situations where the 
different choice alternatives yield different streams of reward 
rates (Kalenscher et al., 2003).
similArities And differences between economic, biologicAl, 
And psychologicAl models of choice behAvior
The previous paragraph shows that, even though rate maximization 
is a prescriptive, normatively flavored theory and the matching law 
is a descriptive, empirically derived model, both approaches make 
very similar predictions. However, the similarities between rate 
maximization and DU are less apparent, and their correspondence 
is also less evident than for EU and risk sensitivity theory in deci-
sion making under risk. In fact, the differences between the two 
approaches seem more obvious at first glance than their similari-
ties. For instance, DU and optimal foraging theory differ in that 
DU makes no prediction about the optimality of preferring small, 
short-term or large, long-term rewards, whereas optimal foraging 
theory predicts that animals should maximize long-term reward 
rate. On the other hand, whereas DU prescribes time-consistent 
preferences when adding a constant time interval to all rewards 
optimal foraging may predict preference reversals2. Nevertheless, 
despite these differences, both theories have remarkable similari-
ties, too. Both approaches are normative and prescribe rather than 
an identical time interval, then the preference for the small, short-
term reward should be preserved because both rewards should be 
discounted by the same rate.
Animals also make decisions over time: during foraging, 
several time delays affect the rate of energy gain, for instance 
travel time between food patches, handling time of an item of 
prey, time between unsuccessful and successful foraging attempts 
etc. Behavioral ecologists assumed that animals maximizing 
Darwinian fitness should use foraging strategies that maximize, 
in the long run, the net energy gain per time unit, i.e., the ratio 
of food intake to the time needed to obtain or consume the food 
(Stephens and Krebs, 1986). For example, in a choice between 
large, delayed and small, short-term rewards, rate maximiza-
tion predicts that animals prefer large rewards when the ratio 
of reward amount per time unit is higher for the large than for 
the small reward.
The reinforcement learning literature in psychology made 
predictions regarding animal and human decision making over 
time that are comparable to the predictions of rate maximiza-
tion in biology. Thorndike’s (1911) law of effect, stating that 
“responses that produce a satisfying effect in a particular situa-
tion become more likely to occur again in that situation” implies 
that greater reinforcement (more frequent, bigger, or more pre-
ferred rewards) results in greater response rates (more frequent 
behaviors that produce the reward). This has led to formula-
tion of the matching law (Herrnstein, 1961, 1970), according 
to which the relative selection-rate of one out of several choice 
options matches the relative rate of reinforcement offered by that 
option. Hence, the shorter the time intervals between rewards, 
the higher the reward rate, the more often the option offering 
these rewards should be chosen. In other words, as predicted 
by optimal foraging models, animals obeying the matching law 
Figure 2 | Constant vs. hyperbolic discounting of future events. The figure 
describes a choice between a small, short-term outcome or a large, long-term 
outcome (proximal), and another situation in which both outcomes are deferred 
into the future by the same time interval (distant). (A) Constant (here: 
exponential) utility function of a large, delayed (gray line) and small, short-term 
commodity (black line). With exponential discounting, preference stationarity 
holds when the rewards are deferred by the same time interval into the future. 
(B) People seem to place a premium on short-term availability of rewards, 
deflecting the discount into an upward direction for temporally close rewards. 
The resulting hyperbolic discount function can explain preference reversals over 
time. Due to the steeper utility decay for short delays, the utility of the small, 
short-term commodity is higher than the large, delayed reward for temporally 
proximal outcomes, but the utility order reverses when both outcomes are 
deferred into the future.
2Assume an animal chooses between (a) two food items delivered after 2 s (rate: one 
item per second) and, (b), four food items delivered after 8 s (rate: 1/2 items per se-
cond; hence a > b). If both rewards were delayed by 10 s, the energy rate for option (a′) 
would change to 0.17 items per second and for option (b′) to 0.22 items per second. 
Optimal foraging theory predicts preference for a over b, but b′ over a′; DU prescribes 
consistent preference because of constant discounting, i.e., a over b and a′ over b′. 
Note that the rate maximization model can be modified to match DU, for instance 
by assuming a non-linear value function linking Darwinian fitness to energy gain.Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience    June 2011  | Volume 5  |  Article 82  |  4
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either in a prosocial way by, e.g., giving to charity or accepting costs 
to improve the well-being of others, or in a counter-utilitaristic 
way, e.g., in parochial situations where the well-being of others is 
reduced at a cost and without direct benefit to the actor (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002, 2003; Camerer, 2003; 
Baron, in press). Moreover, humans are able to cooperate with a 
partner even if defection would satisfy their material self-interest 
better in the short run (Trivers, 1971; Rilling et al., 2002). In addi-
tion to strategic considerations, such as reputation building, genuine 
social motives like inequity aversion and envy presumably play a role 
during social behavior (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Despite strong 
controversy (see, for instance, Henrich, 2004; Wynne, 2004a, b), 
animal behavior seems to some extent be guided by social motives, 
too. For instance, capuchin monkeys appear to be inequity averse 
(Brosnan and De Waal, 2003), and capuchin monkeys (de Waal 
et al., 2008), tamarins (Hauser et al., 2003), chimpanzees (de Waal 
and Suchak, 2010; Melis et al., 2011), rats (Rutte and Taborsky, 2007, 
2008), fish (Raihani et al., 2010), and various other animals, includ-
ing insects (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981) show behavior resembling 
direct or generalized reciprocity. Not only great apes and monkeys 
(de Waal and Suchak, 2010), but also blue jays (Stephens et al., 2002), 
rats (Viana et al., 2010), fish (Raihani et al., 2010), and many social 
insects, like bees and ants (Kolmer and Heinze, 2000; Ratnieks and 
Helantera, 2009; Rueppell et al., 2010), cooperate with conspecifics 
in social situations; social insects even accept high costs, such as 
sacrificing their own life, if this benefits the society (Ratnieks and 
Helantera, 2009; Rueppell et al., 2010).
Economic models make inadequate assumptions and predic-
tions in non-social contexts, too. For instance, the notions of inter-
nal consistency and stable preferences are often violated: human 
subjects frequently show intransitive preferences, preferring choice 
alternative A over B and B over C, but not A over C (Tversky, 1969; 
Kalenscher and Pennartz, 2010; Kalenscher et al., 2010), or make 
context-dependent choices, preferring A over B, but reversing this 
preference when an inferior option C is added to the pool of choice 
alternatives (also known as a violation of the independence axiom; 
Tversky and Simonson, 1993). Intransitive and context-dependent 
choices can occur when individuals choose between alternatives that 
vary along several dimensions, e.g., gain magnitude and probability. 
People seem to fail to treat each multidimensional option as an 
integrated whole, but appear to compare each attribute separately 
and then consider the difference between attributes instead of the 
difference between utilities attributes
3 (Tversky, 1969; Roelofsma 
and Read, 2000; Brandstätter et al., 2006; Kalenscher and Pennartz, 
2010; Kalenscher et al., 2010). Many animals reveal inconsistent 
preferences, too, even when internal homeostatic drives, such as 
hunger or thirst, are controlled for: honeybees, pigeons, and gray 
jays show intransitive preferences (Navarick and Fantino, 1972, 
describe optimal behavior. They both assume maximization of a 
currency (utility in DU and energy rate in optimal foraging theory). 
Also, they have in common that they condemn a disproportionally 
strong, impulsive preference for immediacy as non-optimal if it 
leads to discontinuous preferences over time (see Frederick et al., 
2002; Kalenscher and Pennartz, 2008; Kalenscher and Tobler, 2008 
for review, but see Stephens and Anderson, 2001; Stephens et al., 
2004). Hence, despite the disparity of the two approaches, both 
frameworks would agree on the classification of a large range of 
different strategies as rational or as anomalous.
In summary, despite considerable differences, the normative lit-
erature in economics and ecology on choice behavior of human and 
non-human animals, and some of the descriptive literature in psy-
chology, makes remarkably similar assertions and predictions about 
decision making under risk and over time. Presumably the most 
notable difference between choice theories in economics, ecology, 
and psychology is the focus (or lack of it) on cognitive processes. 
Whereas theories in economics often explicitly refrain from making 
any statements about the choice-underlying cognitive processes, and 
emphasize their pure focus on outcome instead (in many, if not most 
economic models, a decision maker behaves as if she maximized EU; 
(Samuelson, 1938; Gul and Pesendorfer, 2005), theories in cognitive 
psychology do precisely the opposite, i.e., put the spotlight on process, 
but not outcome. Note, though, that the sub-discipline in psychology 
that has the strongest tradition in using animal subjects, behaviorism, 
shares with economics the strict rejection of investigating mental 
process. Behaviorists are interested in describing stimulus–response 
or response–outcome relationships, and explicitly refuse to make 
any statements about the cognitive “black box” that links stimulus 
with outcome. Biological theories are less strict in their distinction 
between process and outcome, and, whereas some ecological theories 
have a more exclusive emphasis on one or the other, other theories 
combine process and outcome (e.g., Reboreda and Kacelnik, 1991; 
Bateson and Kacelnik, 1996; see Kacelnik, 2006 for review).
the reAlity of decision mAking: humAns And AnimAls 
show very similAr violAtions of economic theory
The previous paragraphs suggested that the difference in human 
and animal economic behavior is much smaller than one may 
think at first glance. This notion is corroborated by several lines of 
research that empirically test predictions of economic theory using 
non-human animals, including monkeys, rats, and pigeons (see 
e.g., Kagel et al., 1975, 1981, 1995; MacDonald et al., 1991; Santos 
and Keith Chen, 2009). These studies show that rats, for instance, 
comply surprisingly well to the predictions of demand theory, price 
theory, labor supply, decision making under risk and intertemporal 
choice. Yet, despite the accuracy of economic theory to account 
for much of human and animal behavior, we know from personal 
experience and countless publications in the literature on deci-
sion making that humans often fail to meet the strict assumptions 
made in classic economic models. Interestingly, many, if not most 
of the violations of the predictions of economic theory that can be 
observed in humans are also found in animals. The next paragraph 
gives a brief and selective overview of some of these violations.
In contradiction to the common assumption of unconditional 
self-interest (discussed, for instance, in Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002), 
most human individuals do care about the well-being of others, 
3For example, assume a decision maker chooses between three gambles: (A) win 
$40 with probability p = 0.4, (B) win $45 with p = 0.35, and (C) win $50 with 
p = 0.3. This individual may consider the difference in probability between gambles 
A and B (∆p) = 0.05) too small to care about, and consequently chooses the gamble 
with the higher gain magnitude [∆(gain) = $5], hence A > B. The same logic applies 
to choices between B and C, hence B > C. However, the difference in probability 
between A and C [(∆p) = 0.1] may exceed a cognitive “threshold,” and, because 
of the participant’s risk aversion, she may choose the safer gamble with the higher 
probability, hence C > A.www.frontiersin.org  June 2011  | Volume 5  |  Article 82  |  5
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Reflection effects suggest that, apparently, choices are not made with 
respect to final states, but with respect to changes in final states, i.e., 
with respect to gains and losses. Risk attitude and the reflection effect 
are not only functions of objective gains and losses, but the way a 
problem is (verbally) presented affects the way it is cognitively treated 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 1984). For example, the choice of 
words can influence whether one and the same prospect is perceived 
as a choice between gains, or as a choice between losses. Such fram-
ing of a decision problem has an effect on the subjects’ risk attitude 
and determines whether she is risk-averse (for gains) or risk-prone 
(for losses). Moreover, humans show a strong overweighting of rare 
events, and a literal discontinuity in preference when certain outcomes 
become available (certainty effect; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
Rats and various birds also show reflection effects and reversals of 
risk attitudes (Kacelnik and Bateson, 1996; Bateson and Kacelnik, 
1998), and rats (MacDonald et al., 1991) and honeybees (Shafir et al., 
2008) show certainty effects. Moreover, starlings show framing effects 
when making decisions under risk: they reverse their risk preference 
depending on whether the relative reward levels in a risky condition 
are higher or lower than the reward level in a standard “frame” (Marsh 
and Kacelnik, 2002). Another violation of economic theory includes 
the sunk-cost fallacy – the continued investment of money, time, effort, 
or resources into an unsuccessful project over a long period of time 
although the project clearly yields no results, and an investment into 
an alternative activity would promise better outcomes (Kogut, 1990; 
Arkes and Ayton, 1999). Pigeons commit the sunk-cost fallacy, too: 
their persistence to respond on a pecking key in an expected ratio 
schedule in which a probabilistic reward is delivered if a fixed ratio 
performance (a fixed number of responses) with variable response 
frequency requirements is met, is strongly influenced by their previous 
effort investment on that key (Navarro and Fantino, 2005). Finally, 
the endowment effect refers to the observation that goods that are in 
possession of a subject seem to be valued higher by the subject than 
goods that can be purchased (Grether and Plott, 1979). Endowment 
effects can be found in chimpanzees, too (Brosnan et al., 2007).
Note that the existence of these violations does not falsify EU 
or other economic or biological theories; it merely implies that 
economic theory does not apply to people (or animals) who do 
not meet the rationality assumptions posited by economic theory 
(Samuelson, 1938). However, it is of crucial interest for economists 
and biologists alike to understand why animals and humans so fre-
quently and systematically violate economic or ecological theory. 
Only animal research offers the opportunity to use invasive tools, 
and thus manipulate cognitive mechanisms and their neural sub-
strates to study the effect on economic behavior. Importantly, there-
fore, investigation of animal choices and their neural substrates in 
carefully translated experimental paradigms could yield data on the 
neural implementation of decision parameters that would otherwise 
be hard to obtain. These data should ultimately be used to update 
existing models of human brain function in economic decisions.
how cAn AnimAl models inform economic reseArch?
AnimAl behAvior offers insight into the evolutionAry roots 
of decision mAking
Of course, one of the foremost reasons to use animals in decision 
research is methodological, as briefly touched upon in the introduc-
tion. Neuroeconomics aims to reveal the neural processes underlying 
1975; Shafir, 1994; Waite, 2001), and hummingbirds show violations 
of the independence axiom and make context-dependent decisions 
(Bateson et al., 2003).
Choices are particularly prone to inconsistency when making deci-
sions over time. It has been repeatedly shown that preferences reverse 
when the delays to both rewards are advanced or deferred in time, and 
basically a discontinuity of preference can often be observed when 
immediate outcomes become available4 (time-inconsistent preferences; 
Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; Benzion et al., 1989; Ainslie and Haslam, 
1992; Green et al., 1994; Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995; Frederick et al., 
2002; Kalenscher and Pennartz, 2008; Kalenscher and Tobler, 2008). 
Such non-stationarity of intertemporal preferences suggests that peo-
ple add extra value to short-term availability of rewards (illustrated in 
Figure 2B). The disproportionally high value placed on short-term 
rewards is believed to be responsible for the fact that most humans 
find it very difficult to act in accordance with their long-term interest 
(Haynes, 2009). Examples include breaking diets, living unhealthy life-
styles, financial illiteracy, insufficient retirement provisions, substance 
abuse and even mundane issues like postponing dentist appointments. 
The inadequacy of DU to account for the reality of intertemporal 
choice behavior is even more apparent when dealing with delayed 
losses or aversive events. DU did not make a particular distinction 
between the treatment of losses and gains: the aversiveness of losses 
should be discounted as much as the attractiveness of gains when 
the outcome of a decision is more and more delayed. However, it has 
been shown that the attractiveness of gains is reduced faster than the 
aversiveness of losses (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981), implying a different 
discount rate for gains than for losses. An even greater challenge for 
DU is the observation that many human subjects prefer to expedite a 
loss instead of delaying it. If losses loom less when they are temporally 
remote, as predicted by DU, subjects should be ready to defer losses 
into the future. However, many subjects actually prefer to incur a loss 
or an aversive event immediately rather than delay it (Loewenstein, 
1987; Benzion et al., 1989). Much like humans, a whole range of differ-
ent animals, including monkeys, pigeons, rats, mice, and even insects 
show non-stationary, time-inconsistent intertemporal choices in tasks 
involving front-end delay (i.e., adding a common time interval to 
both options), and place extra value on instant outcomes (Rachlin 
and Green, 1972; Ainslie, 1974, 1975; Green et al., 1981; Bateson and 
Kacelnik, 1996; Kacelnik, 1997; Isles et al., 2003; Kalenscher et al., 2005, 
2006a; Kalenscher and Pennartz, 2008; Kim et al., 2008; Louie and 
Glimcher, 2010). When choosing between timed aversive events, rats, 
much like humans, sometimes accelerate, rather than defer electric 
shocks (Knapp et al., 1959).
Some violations of economic theory are less intuitive than time-
inconsistent preferences. Even though according to EU or other classic 
economic models, risk attitudes should be consistent when making 
decisions under risk, individuals prefer certain options when gambling 
for gains, but risky options when gambling to avoid losses (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979). This reversal of risk attitude has been termed 
the reflection effect because the reflection of the prospects around 0 
(changing the sign from gains to losses) reverses the preference order. 
4For example, when given the choice between receiving $10 today, or $20 in a year, 
many individuals prefer $10 today. If both options were shifted into the future by, 
say, 50 years (now the choice is between $10 in 50 years and $20 in 51 years), most 
individuals would prefer the more delayed $20.Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience    June 2011  | Volume 5  |  Article 82  |  6
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 animals, but the same decision rules may fail to perform well in our 
“modern” binary-choice environments where over-impulsiveness 
is a vice, not a virtue.
In contrast to the view that violations of normative ideals are 
maladaptive, others (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996; Goldstein and 
Gigerenzer, 2002; Hutchinson and Gigerenzer, 2005; Brandstätter 
et al., 2006) maintain that human decision rules are as adaptive 
now as they were when they evolved because the benefits of these 
rules, such as computational speed and accuracy, outweighed the 
drawbacks, such as the occasional non-optimal choice, back then as 
much as now. According to this view, comparative research yields 
optimality criteria that were previously not recognized or consid-
ered in traditional economic models (Hutchinson and Gigerenzer, 
2005). Comparative research may thus contribute to modifying and 
amending existing normative theories to improve their descriptive 
validity and explanatory power. For example, a decision maker who 
maximized expected utility for decision making under risk should 
behave as if she integrated each outcome’s probability with the utility 
of the outcome, and compared these integrated utilities across out-
comes. Such a computation involves several mental transformations: 
translation of objective reward magnitude into utility, multiplication 
with an accurate mental representation of probability, repeating this 
for every option, and comparing these integrated expected utilities 
across options. Several authors argued that the direct comparison of 
the attributes, i.e., comparing probabilities and reward magnitudes 
separately, provides in most cases a much more accurate, fast, precise, 
easy, and less error-prone estimation of the best option than the 
“economically sound” way, albeit at the cost of making inconsistent 
choices in special circumstances (Russo and Dosher, 1983). It has 
been argued that such decision rules evolved because they maxi-
mized Darwinian fitness in animals (Houston, 1997) and prevail 
because they continue to produce near-optimal decision outcomes 
in humans, too (Russo and Dosher, 1983; Brandstätter et al., 2006).
However, identifying the evolutionary basis of choice behavior 
is not the only reason to conduct animal research on economic 
decision making. The analysis of animal behavior is a convenient, 
economical, and sound way to test competing economic decision 
models in optimally controlled experimental environments. The 
cultural, cognitive and motivational confounds and the experimen-
tal design issues related to differences in belief- and value-systems 
that are very difficult to overcome in human research are not an 
issue in animal studies. Moreover, animal models allow for experi-
mental manipulations, including real appetitive and aversive conse-
quences, that are for practical and ethical reasons not implementable 
in human research. As pointed out by Kagel et al. (1995), animals 
are a mean to probe the elementary principles of microeconomic 
theory: if these basic principles fail to account for the behavior of 
simple organisms, such as rats or pigeons, in simple choice situa-
tions, such as Skinner box experiments, how can they be trusted 
in much more complex situations involving much more complex 
organisms, such as our worldwide economic systems with human 
actors? Or, in other words, “[…] a theory that works well across spe-
cies has a greater likelihood of being valid than one that works will 
with only one, or a limited set of, species.” (Kagel et al., 1995, p. 4).
Economic research on animals is often criticized on the grounds 
that animals are considered irrational and instinct-driven. Hence, 
how could economic theory that relies on the assumption of 
economic decision making. The majority of the most accurate and 
promising technologies used in neuroscience research cannot be 
used on humans for ethical and practical reasons, including basic 
manipulations such as lesion studies, electrophysiology, microdi-
alysis, psychopharmacology and others. As trivial as it is to point 
out, animal models are therefore an indispensible and crucial tool in 
neuroeconomic research. However, we hope to have convinced the 
reader by now that methodological reasons are not the only grounds 
to use animal subjects for studying economic decision making.
In the previous chapters, we have emphasized the parallels in 
the theoretical models on human and animal decision making and 
pointed up the correspondence in actual economic behavior. The 
similarities in compliance with and violations of the predictions of 
economic theory suggest that some rudiments of human decision 
patterns can also be found in non-human animals. This implies that 
human and animal decision making may share evolutionary roots: 
presumably, the way we make decisions today is the result of natural 
selection, so that the choice mechanisms found in modern humans 
probably once (and maybe still today) equipped decision makers 
in the best possible way to adapt to and deal with the intricacies of 
the environments in which they evolved. This offers unique insights 
into the sense or nonsense of violating optimality principles, such 
as variable and time-inconsistent preferences.
Several authors argue that, although the decision rules used by 
modern humans provided the highest possible fitness increases to 
animals in the environments in which they evolved, they may actu-
ally be maladaptive today and fail to perform well in the intricate and 
flexible environmental structure of modern societies (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1996). Take the example of time-  inconsistent inter-
temporal choices: Stephens (2002, 2008) maintains that the short-
sighted, over-impulsive decision mechanisms observed in animals 
when making intertemporal decisions are actually well adapted 
to meet the challenges an animal is facing in a real environment. 
An animal’s real environment does, for example, have a sequential 
foreground/background structure. Sequential means that deci-
sions are usually not between binary options (choose either A or 
B, which is usually the case in laboratory experiments), but between 
a sequence of options, such as the decision whether to stay in a 
currently exploited, depleting food patch or leave to another food 
patch (which involves traveling time/effort and the risk of not find-
ing an equivalent one), or whether to attack a prey item or continue 
searching for better prey. Foreground/background means that an 
animal usually follows a default strategy (background: searching for 
food) that needs to be put on hold for the time being if a potential 
food item is encountered (foreground). Several authors (Stephens 
and Anderson, 2001; Stephens, 2002, 2008) have shown that ani-
mals making non-optimal decisions in artificial laboratory situ-
ations actually choose optimally in economically equivalent, but 
sequential foreground/background choice situations that meet the 
criteria of higher ecological validity. Hence, the very same choice 
rules that perform well in these “natural” choice scenarios, produce 
deviations from normative models, such as impulsive, delay-over-
sensitive preferences in artificial laboratory settings. If the choice 
mechanisms humans employ to make intertemporal decisions share 
common evolutionary roots with non-human animals, then natural 
selection has favored decision rules that are optimally adapted to 
the sequential foreground/background environment of foraging www.frontiersin.org  June 2011  | Volume 5  |  Article 82  |  7
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rewards. Food and money are essentially dissimilar commodities: 
whereas food is a primary reward (eliciting a strong direct hedonic 
response), money is a powerful secondary reinforcer (money itself 
does not produce a hedonic response, only its association with pri-
mary reinforcers makes it a reward). This calls into question in how 
far the results of comparative intertemporal choice experiments are 
commensurable. Moreover, during intertemporal choice studies, 
the delays associated with money in human studies are usually in the 
range of months or years, whereas the delays associated with food 
rewards in animal studies are usually in the range of seconds. Even 
though one may dismiss comparative human and animal research 
as non-commensurable in principle based on these grounds, recent 
attempts in the intertemporal choice literature to match the experi-
mental procedures used in humans to the ones common in animal 
research suggest the opposite. The incentives used in these studies 
involved primary rewards, such as liquids (McClure et al., 2007) 
and pictures of the opposite sex (Hayden et al., 2007) and involved 
much shorter delays. The results show that human participants 
exhibited the same behavioral patterns found with secondary rein-
forcers, such as money. Moreover, the neural networks involved in 
making intertemporal decisions for primary rewards, with delays 
in the seconds to minutes range, were remarkably similar to the 
networks involved in financial intertemporal decisions with delays 
in the range of days to months (McClure et al., 2004, 2007). The 
procedure-independence of behavior and neural mechanism sug-
gests that the agreement of intertemporal choice behavior in ani-
mals and humans cannot easily be dismissed based on procedural 
grounds alone. In partial support of this, in an experimental design 
that was manufactured to allow best-possible comparison between 
species, Rosati et al. (2007) showed that humans were generally only 
as delay-tolerant, and often even slightly less patient than chim-
panzees and bonobos when waiting for future primary rewards. 
Because of the parallel in delay tolerance between humans and apes, 
and since the degree of patience exhibited by the apes exceeded the 
level predicted by common short-term maximization models, the 
authors conclude that the capacity to endure long delays for food 
evolved before the human lineage split, suggesting that apes and 
humans share common intertemporal choice mechanisms, at least 
for primary rewards. However, because humans were substantially 
more patient to wait for monetary rewards, they also suggested 
that the human ability to delay gratification for secondary rein-
forcers is unprecedented in the animal kingdom, raising doubts 
about whether the mental processes for primary and secondary 
rewards are identical. Nevertheless, given the indications discussed 
above, the overall evidence implies that the procedural differences 
in studies using primary and secondary reinforcers, and the mental 
processes involved, may be less significant than feared.
Also in the domain of decision making under risk, there are 
elementary differences in the typical procedures used in animal and 
human research. In humans, subjects are usually instructed about 
the probabilities of a gain or a loss, often in one-shot scenarios 
(only one question asked, no repetitions). By contrast, because ani-
mals cannot be verbally instructed, reward probabilities are usually 
operationalized as reward frequencies in multi-trial settings, so that 
a reward with a probability of 0.8 implies that, on average, 8 out 
of 10 trials are rewarded. It is likely that extracting reward prob-
abilities from reward frequencies involves fundamentally different 
rational decision makers be applied to animal behavior? In addi-
tion to the problematic usage of the word “instinct,” we hope to have 
conveyed the message that the differences in animal and human 
behavior and cognition may be a matter of degree, and not of kind, 
as testified by the remarkable conformity of animal decision making 
with the principles of microeconomic theory (Kagel et al., 1995), 
and also with the parallels between human and animal behavior 
in violating them.
In sum, we argue that neither pure theoretical reasoning nor 
exclusive experimentation with human subjects will be sufficient to 
obtain a comprehensive picture of human decision making, includ-
ing where humans conform to the principles of rational choice 
models and where and why humans violate them. We maintain that, 
in order to understand not only how we make decisions, but also to 
investigate why our decisions are what they are, it is imperative to 
know the reserve constraints, evolutionary pressures, and adaptive 
benefits that molded the choice behavior in the first place, aiming 
to add construct validity to the models. We conclude that the prime 
way to obtain access to the evolutionary pressures shaping our deci-
sion mechanisms and to identify common denominators in choice 
behavior is to study animal behavior and its neural mechanisms.
cAution is required when drAwing pArAllels between humAn 
And AnimAl behAvior
In the previous paragraphs, we have emphasized the parallels in 
the theoretical models on human and animal decision making and 
pointed up the similarities in economic behavior. Admittedly, we 
conveniently skipped the discussion of the differences in theories 
and behavior. However, if we want to use animal models to explain 
human behavior, it is imperative to know not only the similarities, 
but also the differences across species. Moreover, it is dangerous to 
draw cross-species parallels in behavior and mechanism too quickly 
since many findings may have face validity only. That is, because 
a problem can be solved by a plethora of different mechanisms, it 
is quite possible that human and animal economic choice behav-
ior, and many of the violations of rational choice observed across 
species, appear similar and are therefore given identical names, 
while the underlying cognitive and neural processes may be fun-
damentally different. Even though this is less of a predicament 
for traditional economics given that economics is conventionally 
only interested in prescribing choice–outcome relations, not in 
identifying the choice-underyling mental and neural processes, this 
is particularly problematic for disciplines interested in those very 
processes, including cognitive psychology, comparative biology, 
and neuroscience. Therefore, much of comparative research aims 
to identify which mental processes are comparable across species, 
and which ones are not (Rosati et al., 2007).
Moreover, as the previous paragraphs illustrated, caution is 
even more warranted when drawing parallels between human and 
animal economic behavior since the experimental designs used 
may bias results and their interpretation. For obvious reasons, the 
procedures and designs used to elicit the behaviors in humans 
and animals described in the preceding paragraphs have several 
fundamental differences. The most evident difference lies in the 
incentivization used to motivate human and animal participants: 
whereas humans are usually paid contingent on their choices or are 
instructed to imagine virtual payoffs, animals receive food or liquid Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience    June 2011  | Volume 5  |  Article 82  |  8
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impulsiveness,   present-bias, or with choices of the most tempo-
rally proximal option, as revealed by functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (Hariri et al., 2006; Glimcher et al., 2007; Kable and 
Glimcher, 2007), one would expect that less ventral striatum activity 
would predict more delay tolerance. However, the opposite has been 
found in animal research: rats with lesioned ventral striatum are 
more, not less impulsive, compared to control rats (Cardinal et al., 
2001), suggesting that the integrity of ventral striatum is necessary 
for maintaining self-control (in the sense of delay-tolerance). Even 
though it is impossible to entirely rule out that the ventral striatum 
plays a functionally different role in rats and humans during inter-
temporal choice, this explanation is unlikely because the ventral 
striatum is phylogenetically identical and homologous across species 
(Reiner et al., 1984; Pennartz et al., 1994; Durstewitz et al., 1999; 
Mezey and Csillag, 2002; Izawa et al., 2003). It is more likely that 
the ventral striatum plays a role in optimizing decisions over time, 
according to which too much or too little ventral striatal activity 
results in suboptimal, impulsive decisions. This idea is supported 
by a wealth of findings in the psychopharmacology literature sug-
gesting that both amplifying and antagonizing the dopaminergic 
input into the ventral striatum increases impulsiveness in rats and 
humans (Evenden and Ryan, 1996; Cardinal et al., 2000; Cardinal, 
2006; Boettiger et al., 2007; Buckholtz et al., 2010; Pine et al., 2010). 
We conclude from this example that comparative research provides 
better answers to the question of the role of ventral striatum in 
intertemporal choice than research with either species alone. Hence, 
what is needed is a comprehensive comparative approach, prefer-
ably across humans and multiple species of non-human animals, in 
which lab studies on animal and human economic decision making 
are additionally complemented by field studies to probe the theories 
in real-world environments.
conclusion
In this perspective review, we have argued that, even though the 
contexts wherein economic decisions made by humans on the one 
hand and animals on the other can be vastly different, economic 
theory can be remarkably successfully applied to human and animal 
behavior alike. We regard the critical examination of economic 
theory the prime objective of performing experiments in deci-
sion making and we maintain that in this light it is imperative to 
include animal models in the arsenal at our disposal. In the worst 
case, results obtained in animals will corroborate those obtained 
from humans, strengthening the existing theory. Preferably, though, 
comparative research will uncover inconsistencies in choice behav-
ior between humans and animals that allow for an improved, more 
comprehensive description of choice behavior and possibly force 
us to re-think the basis of economic theory in the light of the evo-
lutionary roots of choice.
A potential problem using this approach remains that results 
obtained with human and animal choice paradigms could have only 
face validity in reproducing each others’ findings, and could diverge 
in the underlying cognitive processes subserving economic deci-
sion making. Rather than viewing this as a discredit to comparative 
research, we see underconstrainment of the cognitive processes 
governing choice behavior as an invitation to bridge the fields of 
biology, psychology and economics in further, careful probing of 
the neural basis of economics decision making across species.
cognitive and neural systems than when being instructed about 
these attributes in one-shot sessions. Moreover, several authors 
pointed out that tasks involving probabilistic rewards may not be 
interpreted by the animal subject as a decision under risk, but as an 
intertemporal choice (Rachlin et al., 1986; Hayden and Platt, 2007; 
Kalenscher, 2007). According to this idea, it is possible that reward 
frequencies are construed as delays so that, for instance, a reward 
with a probability of 0.5 is perceived as a reward with a delay of, 
on average, two trials duration. However, here again, several lines 
of evidence suggest that procedural differences are not necessarily 
a blackout argument to dismiss any belief in a similarity between 
human and animal decision making under risk. For instance, some 
behavioral patterns in human behavior that are found when prob-
abilities are instructed can also be found when probabilities have 
to be extracted from reward frequencies. For example, in a study 
touched upon above, Fantino and Navarro found that humans 
and pigeons were equally likely to commit the sunk-cost fallacy in 
a task in which the (human and avian) participants had to decide 
whether to persist to respond in an expected ratio schedule, or 
abort a trial and start a new one (Navarro and Fantino, 2005). 
By contrast, others argue that probabilities extracted from experi-
ence induce different behavioral biases than instructed probabili-
ties (Hertwig et al., 2004). For instance, the typical overweighting 
of rare events when probabilities are instructed (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979) contrasts with a characteristic underweighting of 
low likelihoods when probabilities are extracted from experience 
(Hertwig et al., 2004). However, comparative research with bees and 
humans suggest that this divergence of evidence between descrip-
tive and experience-based likelihood extraction can be attributed 
to perceptual noise when extracting information from experience, 
and the original overweighting, in both bees and humans, can be 
reinstated when perceptual noise is reduced (Shafir et al., 2008). 
This would suggest, again, that procedural differences are less sig-
nificant than feared. However, another study found that preference 
reversals (here: the tendency to place higher value on a high risk, 
high magnitude gamble, but to prefer a low risk, low magnitude 
gamble) are reduced when human subjects extract probabilities 
from experience, and not from description (Chu and Chu, 1990).
In conclusion, it is still under debate whether animal models for 
decision under risk are suitable approximations of human deci-
sion making, given the controversy whether the mental processes 
involved when extracting probability information from experience 
or instruction are identical. Nevertheless, at least some evidence sug-
gests that animals and humans behave similarly when procedural 
differences are controlled for, implying, but not proving, that the 
underlying choice mechanisms may be similar, too. We want to 
stress that this uncertainty is by no means reducing the necessity of 
animal research. On the contrary, because parallels in brain func-
tioning cannot always straightforwardly be drawn between humans 
and animals at large, but also between different species of animals 
and their diverging brain connectivity involved in choice behavior, 
exactly those differences between species can be highly informative 
and can shed light on the function of the underlying systems. For 
example, the conclusion that the cognitive and neural mechanisms 
underlying intertemporal choice are identical across species is not 
always straightforwardly supported by the empirical reality: because 
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